“On 6 October 1973, the Yom Kippur war broke out between a coalition of Arab states and Israel. At 6 A.M. that morning, Kissinger, asleep in the Waldorf, was taken by surprise by the Arab attack – as were the CIA and the rest of the world”.

Alistair Horne – British Historian

Fifty years ago next month, on 6^th October 1973 the combined forces of Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, the Sinai in the west and the Golan Heights in the northeast. This became known as the Yom Kippur War. The surprise attack occurred on the Jewish Yom Kippur holiday when most of the Israeli military were on leave.

Egypt’s prime reason for the attack was to force Israel to negotiate a peace treaty for the return of the Sinai. The Egyptians did not advance any further than a narrow strip of the Sinai that could be protected by SAM missile batteries. However, the Syrians had different aims, to retake the Golan Heights taken in 1967 Six Day War and destroy Israel. With the unexpected success of the Six Day War, Israel was arrogant, complacent, overconfident, and believed that their intelligence would anticipate any assault.

In particular, the battle of the Golan Heights has some important lessons for managers and leaders.

More than 1,400 Syrians tanks, 28,000 troops and 600 artillery pieces poured into the Golan Heights, opposed by just 180 Israeli tanks, 3,000 troops and 60 artillery pieces. Syrian intelligence had estimated that due to the Yom Kippur holiday it would take 20 hours for the Israeli reservists to reinforce the Golan Heights, however instead it took 10 hours.

By 5pm on 7^th October with the Israelis under sustained pressure, the Syrians at the instruction of their President, unexpectedly halted their advance on the road to Galilee. The bridges over the Jordan River were virtually undefended and the road to Israel was open to the invading force.

Despite the overwhelming numbers, the Israeli forces manage to hold the advance in time for the reservists to arrive. In what became known as the ‘valley of tears’, the Syrian armoured forces suffered horrendous losses against a far numerically inferior foe, turning the tide of the battle for the Golan Heights.

So, what happened?

The Syrians were numerically superior, armed with up-to-date Soviet weaponry and night vision equipment which the Israelis did not have. When their lead tanks were destroyed, the Syrian tanks refused to stop, move off the roads or bypass the destroyed vehicles. This caused roadblocks and made them easy targets for the highly trained Israeli tank crews.

The Syrians refused to manoeuvre unless ordered by higher command. Syrian forces demonstrated a critical lack of adaptability and comprehensive training. This was in direct comparison to the Israeli forces, who despite being outgunned and outnumbered, changed their tactics.

The most famous of the adaptability of tactics was a young Lieutenant Zvi Gringold, known affectionately as ‘Lieutenant Zvicka,’. He became a legend and was awarded Israel’s highest decoration. His hit-and-run tactics initially destroyed 10 Syrian tanks and he was credited with single-handedly holding at bay 50 Syrian tanks. The Syrians thought they were up against a large Israeli force and withdrew. Throughout the night and following day, Gringold continued to engage the Syrians and destroyed another 30 tanks. These tactics were copied by other Israeli tank commanders.

The tide in the battle for the Golan Heights began to turn as arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain the Syrian advance.  The arrival of the reservists was the beginning of the end for Syria. After four days the Israelis succeeded in pushing the Syrians out of the Golan Heights and began their march towards the Syrian capital, Damascus.

What are the lessons for leaders here?

Lesson 1: Remote and authoritarian leadership often fails. The Syrian advance was unexpectedly halted by the Syrian Dictator President Assad, but the road into Israel was virtually undefended. Clearly the best decisions are often made close to the battlefield and in business close to ‘the coal face’ as the managers have a better understanding of the situation.

How often do decrees from head office seem remote and unrealistic?

Lesson 2: Decentralised leadership is far more effective and allows managers to react to the situation. In this case,case, as demonstrated by ‘Lieutenant Ziva’ the Israelis adapted their tactics to meet the situation, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Syrians.

In our former logistics business, we gave our supervisors the authority to manage customers face-to-face on a daily basis, without always referring to the Warehouse Manager. This enabled them to manage the usual crises that occur in logistics in a proactive and ‘customer centric’ way, resulting in customers staying with the business over the long term.

Lesson 3: Over confidence and arrogance are dangerous. With the overwhelming success of the 1967 Six Day War, the Israelis were arrogant. They ignored the intelligence and were caught short. As Andy Gove, the founder and former CEO of Intel said; “only the paranoid survive”. Gove warned against the ‘inertia of success’.

Can you think of any businesses that were initially successful but failed because they were complacent and arrogant?

Kodak dominated the photographic film industry with over 50% of the global market share. It ignored the market disruption caused by digital cameras. Ironically, a Kodak engineer in 1975 invented the digital camera, but it was ignored by management. In 2012, Kodak filed for bankruptcy.

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